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WORK AND FAMILY DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK: A MOTIVATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

We introduce motivation theory as a way of understanding the decision-making process in the work and family context. We use core concepts from motivation theory – extrinsic, intrinsic and prosocial motivation – and link them to motivational learning to build our framework. We then propose a framework that illustrates the motivational factors that influence work-family decision-making and offer propositions focused on the motivational consequences for individuals that will impact their future decision-making processes.

Keywords: decision-making, motivational learning, motivational structure, work-family.

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Introduction

Research on the work-family interface has sought to understand how the work and family domains are interrelated (Burke and Greenglass, 1987; Carlson, Kacmar, Wayne and Grzywacz, 2006; Edwards and Rothard, 2000; Zedeck, 1992). One stream of research has focused on the work-family conflict which exists due to competing role demands that cannot be fulfilled simultaneously (Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985). Individuals make cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage demands that exceed their personal resources (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). In particular, coping strategies are decisions which aim to reduce conflict and harm from life stressors (Aryee, Luk, Leung and Lo, 1999; Chinchilla and Poelmans, 2003; Dallimore and Mickael, 2011; Drach-Zahavy and Somech, 2008). The other stream of research seeks to show that the interaction of the two domains produces positive effects (Greenhaus and Powell, 2006; Kirchmeyer, 1992; Wayne, Musisca and Fleeson, 2004). Individuals make decisions regarding the benefits they transfer and how they transfer them (Kim and Las Heras, 2012). In both perspectives, individuals as decision-makers are implicitly located at the heart of the work-family interface.

Most research on work-family decision-making has been at the behavioral level. This includes, for instance, decision-making in dual-career couples (e.g. Pagnan, Lero, MacDermid and Wadsworth, 2011), expatriates (e.g. Lazarova, Westman and Shaffer, 2010), gender styles in decision-making (e.g. Yu, 2011) and the relationship between caregiving decisions and family outcomes (Kossek, Colquitt, and Noe, 2001). However, little is known about the internal processes inherent in the work-family decision-making process. In other words, why do individuals choose one alternative over another? What consequences and implications arise from such decisions? And how does this overall process impact the individual him/herself and others from his/her family and work?

The purpose of our paper is to develop a theoretical framework of work-family decision-making from a motivational perspective which will elucidate our understanding of why individuals are driven to certain decisions that may lead to conflict or enrichment. In particular, our model is centered on the *motivational learning* construct, defined as the change that takes place in individuals' decision rule as a consequence of their action (Pérez López, 1991). More

specifically, we posit that a confluence of motivations – the so-called *motivational structure* – guides individuals' actions and impacts individuals' work-family decision-making from which learning is derived, and continually shapes future decisions.

We contribute to the literature by expanding theory building in work and family research in two ways. First, we propose a theoretical framework that points out the centrality of the individual within the work and family domains. However, the individual in our model moves beyond the self-concept formed on the basis of social roles (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Thoits, 1991) to a conception of the individual based on agency and communion (Swann and Bosson, 2010). These two fundamental dimensions are reflected in the human needs for autonomy, relatedness and competence (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser and Deci, 1996). It also helps us understand why a certain role is important (role salience) and how it impacts individuals' decisions.

Second, by bringing a motivational perspective to our model, we broaden the work-family decision-making literature centered on behavioral approaches. We shed light on why individuals decide rather than what and how they decide. Furthermore, we link decision-making to different streams of research, including motivation (in particular, to extrinsic, intrinsic and prosocial motivation theories) and learning, developing an integrative work-family decision-making framework.

Theoretical Review

Most research on work-family decision-making has focused on the types of decisions (e.g. coping skills) and the external consequences of these decisions. Very few studies have examined the internal work-family decision-making process. Existing research highlights that a person's daily problem-solving depends on that person's work salience or family salience, i.e., the extent to which work or family is central to the person's self-concept (Edwards and Rothbard, 2000; Greenhaus and Beutell, 1985; Powell and Greenhaus, 2006). Because role salience is important for a person's total self image and identity (Rothbard, 2001), the centrality of a role can influence individual's choices and decisions (Carlson and Kacmar, 2000). Thus, individuals develop and apply rules that are consistent with their personal identities and choose activities that are congruent with their salient social identity (Powell and Greenhaus, 2010).

Faced with a conflict, however, activity importance is a more powerful cue than role salience in decision-making (Powell and Greenhaus, 2006). Such a proposition represents a step forward from a generic role salience to a prioritization of activities based on their importance. However, what criteria individuals use to evaluate what is important when prioritizing one activity over another, and what consequences are derived from the decisions taken based on the evaluation and prioritization, are still unknown. Consequently, there is a need to understand the reasons why people evaluate and prioritize an activity as being more important than another. In order to do so, we draw from motivational theory.

Motivation in work-family decision-making

Motivation explains why, in a given situation, a person selects one response over another (Bargh, Gollwitzer and Oettingen, 2010) and provides the reasons that drive actions (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Grant, 2008; Mitchel and Daniels, 2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have been broadly studied in the work motivation literature, both theoretically and empirically

(Leonard, Beauvais and Scholl, 1999). Extrinsic motivation refers to doing something because of external controls, incentives, punishments and rewards that move a person to act. Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable (Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman, 1959; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Schwartz, 1999). Both types of motivation are centered on the self.

However, not all actions are self-interested. Some actions are oriented toward other people (De Dreu, 2006). The drive for action inspired by/for others has been framed as transcendent motivation (Pérez López, 1991, 1993), transitive motivation (Llano, 1997), and altruism (Hoffman, 1981a; Hoffman, 1981b; Krebs, 1975). More recent research has introduced the construct of prosocial motivation (Grant 2007, 2008). The prefix "pro-" in "prosocial" implies an orientation toward others. In prosocial motivation, interpersonal and affective relationships are especially important (Elizur, 1984; Grant and Berry, 2011; Grant and Sumanth, 2009; Kanfer, 2009). Prosocial motivation includes the desire to expend effort to benefit other people (Batson, 1987), caring about beneficiaries (Pérez López, 1991, 1993), being cooperative (Tjosvold and Deemer, 1980), investing time and effort without fear of possible personal costs (Mattingly and Clark, 2010; Pérez López, 1993) and finding meaning (Fried and Ferris, 1987; Katz, 1978). Prosocial behavior is voluntary and extra-role (De Dreu, 2006).

Grant (2008) posits that intrinsic and prosocial motivations are not exclusive, but that they collaborate, interact and impact identity. Indeed, the perspective-taking in prosocial motivation is oriented to others but not necessarily at the expense of self-interest (De Dreu, 2006). The self is not excluded because the action also affects the individual. Batson, Ahmad, Powell and Stocks (2008: 136) state that "an individual often has more than one ultimate goal at a time, and so more than one motive." Thus, when multiple motives are present, there may be an *inter-motivational conflict*, which points to a conflict between extrinsic/intrinsic motives and prosocial motives. Faced with an inter-motivational conflict, we propose that it is individuals who attribute different weights to each motive. The confluence of motives with different weights defines the *motivational structure* of an individual (Pérez López, 1991, 1993). The motivational structure is dynamic in that it changes its form after each decision because learning takes place in the individual.

Learning in work-family decision-making

Motivation is one of the characteristics that most influences the learning that takes place (Colquitt et al., 2000), whether consciously or unconsciously (Bandura, 1976; Gioia and Manz, 1985; Swann and Bosson, 2010). Individuals learn through experience, knowledge and perceptions from everyday life and diverse disciplines (Paul 1992). Experiential learning (Kolb, 1984; Pérez López, 1991, 1993) entails: (1) adding something new to memory (new perception), (2) developing a new operational skill (operational learning), and (3) changing the decision rule (motivational learning). Experiential learning can also take place within human interaction. Thus, when person A and person B interact, they learn from each other but also from the interaction and change the decision rule in their next interaction (Pérez López, 1991; Simon, 1979). Consequently, the range of feasible interactions in the future is amplified or reduced, depending on the nature of the experience and what they learn from it (Ariño 2005; Pérez López, 1993; Simon, 1979).

Furthermore, research shows that learning is systemic; organizations learn from individuals and individuals learn from organizations (March, 1991). The systemic characteristic of learning is not limited only between individuals and organizations but also expands to family and society

(Ben-Porath, 1980; Bronfenbrenner and Evans, 2000; Voydanoff, 1980). When individuals learn, their learning impacts organizational decision-making as it provides new factual decision premises (Simon, 1991). Thus, improvements in individuals lead to improvements in organizational capabilities (Harrison and Kessels, 2004; Watkins and Marsick, 1993). For this to happen, however, individuals must be motivated to use their own improvements at the service of the organization. Hence, we suggest that insight into individuals' motivational structure is critical in order to gain a better understanding of individuals' learning and actions.

A conceptual framework of individual work-family decision-making

Figure 1 shows the individual work-family decision-making framework. It is an iterative process between a person's motivational structure and motivational learning; the motivational structure shapes motivational learning, which in return changes the configuration of the motivational structure.

Figure 1

Individual work-family decision-making conceptual framework



MEX: Extrinsic motive; MInt: Intrinsic motive; MPro: Prosocial motive
b = beta (the weight attributed to the motives)

Traditionally, decision-making has been conceptualized as a rational process of finding an optimal choice given the available information. Individuals' actions entail a process of interaction with an environment that tends to consist of other rational actors (March, 1996). Individuals have certain perceptions of the situation they face and give each perception a particular value, depending on the degree of satisfaction it produces, and choose accordingly (Simon, 1979). However, individuals do not always make conscious decisions as these can been automatic and spontaneous (see George, 2009; Salas, Rosen and Díaz Granados, 2009; Stanovich and West, 2000).

A person who decides rationally follows a conscious path. "Rationality" is similar to "intelligent", "successful" or "reasonable" (March, 1994). We understand rationality as a person's ability to propose alternatives other than those he/she spontaneously desires and to take account of the quality of his / her deliberations (Ariño, 2005; Pérez López, 1991). The concept of *bounded rationality* expresses the idea that, in decision-making, not all alternatives or all consequences of actions are known (March, 1994; Oaksford and Chater 1993; Simon, 1957). There are also situational constraints such as time pressure (Baron, 1985). In a given situation, an individual will reason, evaluate action alternatives, and anticipate the consequences of his/her decision/interaction (Bandura, 1977), while at the same time anticipating the satisfaction the decision will provide. Also, each participant in the interaction will anticipate the other's rationality and is aware that the other is doing likewise (March, 1996).

In any interaction, individuals learn consciously and explicitly (March, 1994) but also unconsciously and implicitly (Pérez López, 1991, 1993; Reber, 1992; Salas et al., 2009). Every decision generates learning which changes individuals by impacting their cognitive, motivational and affective levels and transforming their frames of reference (Mezirow, 1991). Pérez López (1991, 1993) broadens these consequences to include the learning that arises from interactions. Thus, any decision has three types of outcomes: (1) the interaction itself, (2) the internal outcomes for self, and (3) the internal outcomes for others. Consider the following scenario: an individual (person A) decides to stay for a couple of hours longer in the office to help a colleague (person B) finish a job. The outcomes of this decision are: 1) the interaction itself: person A stays and helps person B who finishes the job; 2) the internal outcomes for self: person A is now more capable of helping others at work and elsewhere; 3) the internal outcomes for others: person B feels that he / she is important to person A, trusts person A more, and is inclined to help others too. Therefore, the internal outcomes for self are whatever individuals learn after the decision. In this example, person A has learned to help others regardless of person B's reaction. The internal outcomes for others are whatever others learn, depending on their reactions, which, in this example, may range from being sincerely grateful to thinking that he/she deserved the help or that person A had an obligation to help.

Correct decisions are those in which individuals anticipate the three types of outcomes of each of the various action alternatives (Ariño, 2005). Consider this second example in the family domain. A parent buys a child sweets to stop the child crying. The action plan is effective insofar as the child stops crying, but the decision is incorrect in that it fails to take account of what the parent learns (that he / she is increasingly locked into the option of giving in to the child's demands) or of what the child learns (that it must carry on crying until the parent gives in). An action plan can therefore be effective (i.e. achieve the desired result) and yet incorrect (in that it fails to anticipate the relevant long-term consequences). March (1996: 285) posits that "there is some general consensus that what we see or believe may at times deviate from what is true." Simon (1986: 211) argues that "we must distinguish between the real world and the actor's perception of it and reasoning about it." We suggest that anticipating outcomes is critical in the context of work and family decisions as individuals are in constant interaction. The force that drives an individual to act based on a prior assessment of the three types of outcome is what we call *rationality-based motivation.*

Rationality-based motivation and motives

In this study, we distinguish between motivation and motives. Motivation is the force that pushes us to act, while motives are the reasons for which we act (Pérez López, 1991, 1993). Three types of motives (extrinsic, intrinsic and prosocial) are necessary to satisfy human needs (e.g. Deci and Ryan, 1985; Grant, 2007, 2008; Herzberg, 1982). Motives influence the way people act and are interrelated (Grant, 2008). The weight that an individual gives to each type of motive determines his / her *motivational structure*, which changes following a decision dominated by one of the three motives. So when individuals are rationally motivated, this implies that they have anticipated outcomes (of the interaction, for self and for others) and have attributed weight to motives (extrinsic, intrinsic and prosocial) leading to a specific decision.

In *rationality-based motivation for extrinsic motives* (RMEM), the perspective-taking is internal because the interest is focused on the self, although it is external factors (money, fame, rewards, etc.) that are valued. For example, a person may decide to work overtime and show cooperative behavior because his / her only motive is to win the employee of the year award (recognition). Decisions based solely on extrinsic motives may lead to an increasingly narrow and mechanical view of others. In such cases, the interest in any relationship may be determined by the other's socio-economic status, wealth, power etc., or how useful the others are for achieving individuals' goals, thereby giving rise to an utilitarian relationship (Batson, 1987; Batson et al., 2008).

In *rationality-based motivation for intrinsic motives* (RMIM), the perspective-taking is likewise internal, but what is valued is the actual outcome of the task or action. Individuals are driven by achievement, competency development, or feeling good as a result of doing. As Batson and colleagues (2008) indicate, in this case, people can also be used instrumentally by individuals. An example is a parent who imposes his / her own interests on the rest of the family by insisting on watching a TV program he / she enjoys regardless of whether anyone else likes it. Decisions driven solely by intrinsic motives may also lead to an increasingly narrow view of what it means to be human, in this case, tending toward a being who is exclusively driven by desires.

In *rationality-based motivation for prosocial motives* (RMPM), the perspective-taking is external because the interest is focused on the other. Individuals focus on others in order to assist them effectively (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; Grant and Berry, 2011; Parker and Axtell, 2001) and to improve their lives (Grant, 2007). In RMPM, the aim is to have a positive impact on others. Individuals care about others and want to help them (Batson, 1987). Regardless of personal costs in terms of time and effort (Grant, 2007), individuals continually invest, even if the recipients do not reciprocate (Pérez López, 1991, 1993). The inclusion of prosocial motives in decision-making may broaden individuals' understanding of what it is to be human. People are not instrumental goals that can be manipulated according to self-interest; rather, they are ultimate goals (Batson et al., 2008). Hence, the use of prosocial motives in decision-making may generate trust because individuals consider the implications of their actions on others who are aware of this prosocial approach.

Proposition 1: Rationality-based motivation is comprised of extrinsic motives (RMEM), intrinsic motives (RMIM) and prosocial motives (RMPM) with different weights for each motive.

Positive and negative motivational learning

Motivational learning happens when there is a change in individuals' motivational structure as a consequence of their action (Pérez López, 1991). Whether the motivational learning is positive or negative will depend on the motives for the decision. When individuals make decisions characterized by inter-motivational conflict, their motivational structure changes. When individuals' decisions are based on extrinsic and / or intrinsic motives only, they may become progressively less sensitive to, and less aware of, the needs of others. If, besides acting out of extrinsic and / or intrinsic motives, individuals consider other people and act out of prosocial motives, individuals may be able to "see" more action alternatives because of a broader knowledge of reality and the trust-based relationships they have formed (Pérez López, 1991).

Positive motivational learning refers to the increased weight of prosocial motives in individuals' motivational structure. Thus, it enhances the ability to consider the needs of others in decisions and to act accordingly, regardless of potentially contrary desires or emotions of self (Ariño, 2005; Pérez López, 1991, 1993). Hence, positive motivational learning enables individuals to increasingly make correct decisions (anticipate the three outcomes). Furthermore, the trust that they may gain from others is a *sine qua non* for all available action alternatives to be feasible in the future. Developing prosocial motives may also lead individuals to feel affective satisfaction for others who reciprocate. Making decisions that RMPM suggests are reasonable, may also encourage individuals to make future decisions in a similar way, spontaneously iterating what they have thought at the beginning to be the right thing to do.

Proposition 2: When prosocial motives weigh more than extrinsic/intrinsic motives in a decision, there is positive motivational learning.

When people learn positively, they anticipate the three types of outcomes and act more out of prosocial motives. As a result, they may have a broader perspective (Carlson et al., 2006) and may be more capable of solving their future problems better, because they comprehend more aspects and variables of reality. Research shows that other people's perspective-taking gives access to viewpoints that provide new information (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White, 2008), which may enable a person to make more accurate judgments. Individuals driven by RMPM may be capable of anticipating all kinds of outcomes and understanding people better (whatever other people's motivational structure is). Positive motivational learning may hence enrich a person's perspective and rationality. As a result, social capital increases, ties with others are more stable and healthier, and there is greater commitment (Chinchilla, 1996).

Proposition 3a: Positive motivational learning reinforces the weight of prosocial motives in the motivational structure.

Proposition 3b: An increase in the weight of prosocial motives in the motivational structure changes the overall configuration of motives.

Negative motivational learning refers to the increased weight of extrinsic and intrinsic motives in individuals' motivational structure. Thus, it decreases the ability to consider the needs of others in decisions (Ariño, 2005; Pérez López, 1991, 1993). Although individuals tend to apply repeatedly a decision that has worked on previous occasions, it may not be feasible in the long run because people lose trust. This may make it more difficult, or even impossible, to solve new problems in the future because the necessary conditions for solving them have been destroyed. With time, the other person may realize that he/she has been used and thus refuses to maintain a relationship. A greater weight on extrinsic/intrinsic motives implies that others have an

instrumental value for the self (Batson, 1987; Batson et al., 2008). When individuals become incapable of valuing others, their ability to maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships may also decline.

Proposition 4: When extrinsic/intrinsic motives weigh more than prosocial motives in a decision, there is negative motivational learning.

Negative motivational learning happens when individuals do not consider others. If this learning is repeated, individuals may become incapable of assessing the impact of their decisions on others. Thus, negative learning may destroy the ability to give and receive affection and to trust other people. Individuals become distanced from the fundamental properties of reality, people, which are a foundation for the effectiveness of action plans. As a result, the motivational structure may suffer a general deterioration.

Proposition 5a: Negative motivational learning reinforces the weight of extrinsic/intrinsic motives in the motivational structure.

Proposition 5b: An increase in the weight of extrinsic/intrinsic motives in the motivational structure changes the overall configuration of motives.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework of work-family decision-making from a motivational perspective. We posit that a confluence of motivations impacts individuals' work-family decision-making, from which learning is derived, and continually shapes future decisions. Our contribution broadens the existing literature on theory-building in relation to work and family in the following aspects.

First, we put the individual back on the center stage as we agree on the need to further study the self in work-family research (Parker and Hall, 1992). We concur with the view that the conception of the individual is fundamental in theory-building (Barnard, 1968; Simon, 1985) and that "individual human action is the key level of analysis" (Elster, 1989: 74). However, we adopt a broader perspective of what the self is and move beyond the self-concept that follows external standards (role salience) to one that follows internal standards (motivation). Hence, our model is centered on the motivational structure and motivational learning which shape individuals' evaluation of what is important and thereby prioritization of one decision over another.

More specifically, our conception of the individual is based on the assumption that agency and communion are universal dimensions underlying much of human behavior and thought (e.g. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu, 2002; Swann and Bosson, 2010). Hence, humans are both individuals and social beings. Thus, autonomy, relatedness and competence are universal necessities, essential for optimal human development and integrity (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Gagné and Deci, 2005; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser and Deci, 1996). In our model, the need for autonomy is captured by the literature on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, basically from a self-perspective. The need for relatedness is captured by studies on prosocial motivation, focused on the other's perspective (Batson 1987; Batson et al., 2008; De Dreu, 2006; Grant, 2007, 2008). Finally, the competence need is necessary in order to develop the other two, so that individuals achieve the above mentioned development and integrity.

Our conception of the individual is also based on the assumption that individuals undergo learning experiences from the decisions they make. More importantly, we propose that these learning experiences impact individuals' motivational structure. In addition, learning experiences shape implicit models of human being, given that people act on the basis of fundamental assumptions or attitudes regarding others, although they are rarely aware that they are doing this (Barnard, 1968). The motivational structure shapes the lenses through which individuals see and understand others: as instruments for achieving individuals' goals or as human beings who also have their own needs and goals. Thus, in a work-family context, the extent to which prosocial motives are present in decision-making is even more important because the two domains are inherently made up of individuals.

Second, we propose a work-family decision-making model that integrates the dynamic nature of motivational structure via motivational learning, thus broadening the assumptions of previous studies which focused on the behavioral level. Furthermore, we suggest that the decision-making process functions as a loop. More specifically, decisions driven by prosocial motives lead to positive motivational learning, which in turn strengths the prosocial motives in a person's motivational structure. This may involve an enriching iterative process, as prosocial motives may improve the quality of the decision itself because individuals have a broader range of action alternatives and thus are able to act in the way most appropriate to the situation (Ariño, 2005; Pérez López, 1991, 1993). People are more willing to engage in social exchanges because of trust (Misztal, 1996). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 255) indicate that "trust lubricates cooperation, and cooperation itself breeds trust". Paraphrasing these authors, we propose that trust makes it easier for people to act out of prosocial motives, and acting out of prosocial motives breeds trust. Research shows that social capital and trusting relationships can be created in the family and subsequently transferred to work situations (Fukuyama, 1995), adding to organizations' capital (Burt, 1992). Indeed, social capital is one of the resources that are transferred between the work and family domains (Carlson et al., 2006).

On the other hand, decisions driven uniquely by extrinsic/intrinsic motives lead to negative motivational learning, which in turn strengths the extrinsic/intrinsic motives in a person's motivational structure. This may be an impoverishing iterative process as the reduced weight of prosocial motives may push individuals to become incapable of understanding people. Giving less value to others may undermine relationships and reduce the ability to be trustable and build stable relationships. The likelihood of making correct decisions may be reduced as individuals may find it increasingly difficult to foresee and anticipate the interaction's consequences due to their diminished capacity for seizing reality. Consequently, the number of feasible alternatives may decrease and the chances of error may increase, leading perhaps to a breakdown in relations and destruction of social capital. Due to the interdependence among domains, family, organization and society are also impoverished. Because the individual is the interface between domains and it is the individual who learns, motivational learning also spills over from one domain to another. The person is a whole, and so is the person's motivational structure, although its configuration changes whenever a decision entails inter-motivational conflict.

Third, we propose that when individuals decide out of prosocial motives in both work and family domains, it may decrease strain-based work-family conflicts because individuals are not dependent solely on the reactions of the environment (extrinsic motives) or the emotional roller-coaster of the self (intrinsic motives). Instead, prosocial motives may act as a buffer, reducing the strain. Consider the following example: Person A maintains an impeccable home because of what guests or neighbors might say. Furthermore, this person seeks only recognition and applause at work. If person A does not get the external appreciation he/she seeks while

being overloaded with work in both domains, person A may be under more strain than person B who also works at home and outside to satisfy the needs of others (e.g. provide a cozy home for the family or ensure that customers get excellent service). Person B has a buffer as he/she depends on his/her own decisions rather than on the reactions of others.

However, prosocial motives may also intensify work-family conflict, as in the case of the executive who works long hours in order to implement a corporate restructuring as humanely as possible, devoting very little time to his/her family. In this case, the executive is bound to experience time- and strain-based work-to-family conflict due to his/her prosocial decision regarding employees but he/she is enriching his/her motivational structure. From a motivational perspective, individuals' decisions impact the work-family interface, but work-family conflict is not necessarily always negative. Its impact will depend on how individuals manage it, by either enriching or impoverishing their motivational structure.

Finally, while we have proposed a rationality-based motivation model, we are aware of research which points out that many non-conscious thoughts, behaviors and feelings are drivers in daily life (Bargh, 2007; George, 2009, Hassin, Uleman and Bargh, 2005; Uleman and Bargh, 1989) and are the basis of the majority of daily behaviors (Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair, and Nosed, 2007; Bargh, 2007). Emotions play a role in choice (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986). Thus, individuals cannot survive without these non-conscious processes. They are necessary shortcuts through which things become routine, because individuals do not know all the alternatives and cannot calculate all the consequences (Simon, 1979). In fact, individuals often do not act from a long-term perspective; instead, they often act as if choices only had immediate effects (Gray, 1998; Herrnstein, 1961; Herrnstein, Rachlin and Laibson, 1997).

This spontaneously-driven motivation is the impulse that leads people to act on the basis of past experience. Individuals act without thinking and do what satisfies their perceptions best. In non-conscious processes, people are not conscious of why they are acting as they do (Wilson, 2002) and are not aware that what makes their behaviors automatic is the lack of questioning of governing values (Argyris, 1982). Thus, automatic decisions are based on an unconscious evaluation of reality, which also implies the existence of a motivational structure. As a direction for future research, we propose the study of decisions based on the non-conscious path and the role of motivational enrichment and impoverishment in that path.

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